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Introduction
From 1997 to 2001 in the Usa we observe a faster growth in the number of Nonemployer …rms (NF ) vis à vis Employer …rms (EF ). This diverse speed of net entry may at …rst appear quite odd. However, to a closer scrutiny it seems to be caused by distinct internal organizations that generate di¤erent reactions to market uncertainty, quite high in those years of end of millennium.
To validate this statement and better understand the phenomenon considered we have to go through the internal organization of …rms according to the category they belong and their infant history.
Start-up …rms (SUFs) are the most dynamic part of the economy with their active development of new goods and technological endeavors. Yet, most of their operating modes are heterogeneous with respect to incumbent consolidated …rms. Often their actions do not adhere to the traditional market canons of Marshallian enterprise and their internal organization departs, in many respects, from that of a purely pro…t-value maximizing …rm (PMF ).
The inner structure and the governance of SUFs show a large variety of organization modes. Most of them appear to be quite far from those pertaining either to the publicly owned corporate, 1 run on behalf of shareholders, and governance metamorphosis, turning a baby …rm into a mature corporate enterprise, a SUF is a strange animal whose behavior may be at odds with standard modelization of PMFs. Why? And in which sense?
The answer may come from the very existence of a large bulk of NFs and in particular Partnerships. If we con…ne to the internal organization of the newborn NFs, we may …nd that Partnerships closely replicate Labor
Managed …rms (LMF ) and individual Proprietorship resemble LMFs, even though in the limit due the single member structure. A similar proposition may be stated for NF Corporations. In LMFs, 5 owners and employees coincide while sharing the governing power of the …rm on an equal foot. Surprisingly enough, this is something that can be found in most NFs, whose market behavior should then be expected to replicate fairly closely that of a
LMF. The question then boils down to what are the implications for entry
strategies of this odd similarity between NFs, one of the most dynamic form of modern baby production, and LMFs, that most analysts regard as a sort of bulky legacy of socialism. 6 Here, we analyze entry strategies of …rms belonging either to the NFs 5 See the canonical models of Ward (1958) , Vanek (1970) , the re…nements of Pestieau and Thisse (1979) , the empirical scrutiny of Pencavel and Craig (1994) , the analysis of LMF oligopolies in Delbono and Rossini (1992) , workers' enterprises in Sertel (1993) , just to mention few contributions. 6 The theory of the LMF has evolved quite a lot in parallel with the growing success of market economies vis à socialist economies. Literature has shown the long run a¢nities between a competitive LMF and its corresponding PMF, despite heterogeneous behavior in the short run. However, some of the problems concerning both the perverse response of the short run supply and the di¢culty of LMFs to get credit are assumed away once we introduce tradeability of memberships -i.e.: workers' enterprises (Sertel, 1982; 1997) - or we assume that credit provided by members of the LMF is subordinate with respect to the credit by banks or by any third agent (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). or to the EFs. Our setting is a dynamic and uncertain one, where a new venture is de…ned as a project that can be carried out at di¤erent points of time and at di¤erent entry-trigger market prices.
Most di¤erences among the two kinds of …rms come from the existence of uncertainty coupled to sunk costs. Thanks to the proximity between the NF and the LMF we show that, in an uncertain dynamic environment, there are circumstances where the NF enters at less favorable conditions becoming the swiftest start-up, while in other circumstances the EF is smarter.
Moreover, we analyze the entry strategies and the size of …rms and interpret the recent growth of NFs in the US during a period of intense …nancial volatility.
Our aim is to see how market price volatility may favor one particular …rm organization.
A by-product of this investigation is that the entry trigger price increases in distinct fashions for the two kinds of …rms. A larger variance makes the investment return more volatile. The value of the option grows but there is a larger incentive to delay entry 7 . In the NF each member shares this option with colleagues. Therefore, he has to bear only a fraction of the entry cost.
If so, the outcome is a higher value of the option without any increase in the incentive to delay entry.
In the next section some data about NFs and EFs are shown. In the third section we present the basic set up. In section four we investigate di¤erent entry policies. In the …fth some comparisons are carried out. In the …nal section concluding remarks are drawn. 7 This e¤ect follows form the "bad news principle of irreversible investment" (Bernanke, 1983 
The basic set up
Here is the basic framework drawing the borders of the environment where we wish to compare the behavior of two SUFs: a NF and an EF.
We assume that:
1) Firms undertake a project of …nite size, corresponding to the start-up decision. We consider a …rm in isolation, even though there are scanty di¤erences with respect to a competitive market (Leahy, 1993) .
2) The investment is irreversibly sunk. It can neither be changed, nor temporarily stopped, nor shut down. Other operating options are neglected for the sake of simplicity of comparisons 14 . The commitment is equal to K.
3) When the …rm is operative the instantaneous short run revenue is
where p t is the market output price, L t is labor input, Q(L t ) is the short run Marshallian production function, with
4) The market price is uncertain and evolves over time according to the following trendless stochastic di¤erential equation: dp t = ¾p t dB t with ¾ > 0 and p 0 = p;
where dB t is the increment of a standard Wiener process and the volatility parameter (¾) is constant over time.
5)
The market wage for unit of labor w is constant.
6) The investment is …nanced either by founding employee-members, in the case of the NF; 15 , or by shareholders, in the case of the EF.
The Nonemployer Firm (NF )
We investigate the NF decision to start-up a new venture and assume that:
(i) the number of employees-members is held …xed after entry 16 ; (ii) each member investing in the project maximizes the discounted value of expected individual net dividends; (iii) each member receives the sum of the accounting dividends plus the contractual wage w.
We solve this problem backwards. First, for any size of the NF (level of L) we evaluate the member option value to enter. Subsequently, we choose L that maximizes the individual option value. 15 This is consistent with the assumption of the existence of a market for NF memberships, operating according to standard …nancial canons (Sertel, 1993 (Sertel, , 1997 . 16 In this sense the NF faces a kind of constraint since it cannot change L and it must decide the optimal entry time.
To evaluate the individual option we calculate the discounted value of expected net individual dividend:
where E 0 (:) is the expectation operator, with the information available at time zero, ½ the riskless interest rate, 17 and w ½ the discounted ‡ow of the market wage, which corresponds to the minimum the NF grants its employeemembers, i.e., a participation constraint.
The employee-member belonging to a NF of size L decides whether and when to start the project by solving an optimal stopping time problem, i.e.
choosing the investment timing which maximizes:
Members of the NF are homogeneous. Each one holds an option to invest corresponding to (4) and has an interest to exercise cooperatively its option at the same time. 18 The option value comes from solving (4). The value of (4), prior to investment, (see McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) , is:
where 1 <¯< 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
and p NF is the critical price that makes the Lth employee-member indi¤erent between investing right away or waiting. Maximizing (5) with respect to p NF we obtain the candidate policy for optimal NF start-up as:
The employee-member's optimal strategy requires investing as soon as the market price exceeds the break-even threshold p NF , where:
where
is long-run average total cost.
Substituting (6) into (5) and rearranging we write, in reduced form, the Lth employee-member's value of the project prior to invest:
where the constant A(L) is given by:
What is the optimal NF dimension? By (7) the optimum requires choosing the L for which A(L) is the largest. Moreover, by (8) , the optimum dimension maximizes a(L); which yields the …rst order condition (FOC) 19 :
Lemma 2 The optimal size of the NF can be obtained from:
Since the r.h.s. of (9) is less than one, a necessary condition for an optimal solution is an output elasticity " QL´L
is a decreasing function of labor (as from Assumption 3).
Although we cannot prove the second order condition (SOC) on a general basis, we can provide examples of functions that are locally concave, such as the following calibrated version of a(L); i.e.: Q = log¸L: We mostly follow suggestions from other studies (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
The Employer Firm (EF )
When does an EF enter the market? Entry is a project of in…nite life and the …rm has to properly tune the input L over time. To ease comparisons we make a simplifying hypothesis that parallels assumption (i) on the NF : labor is variable only ex-ante. The EF selects its project among a set of ventures with the same K; but distinct levels of labor. 20 The market value of a project of dimension L turns out to be:
20 This means a putty-clay technology.
14 Whether and when to ignite the project is the solution of a standard optimal stopping time problem:
Owing to the homogeneity of (3), we have:
where f NF (p; L) is the value of the project for the Lth member of the NF , given by (4) . By analogy with (5), and, as a result of the above arguments,
we obtain:
The EF optimal strategy dictates investing as soon as the price exceeds the break-even level p EF , where:
Then, substituting (12) into (11), the value of the option for an EF is:
where the constant
Again, by (13) , the optimum requires …nding the L for which B(L) is the largest. Moreover, by (14) , e¢cient size maximizes b(L) yielding the following FOC:
22 21 This framework is similar to that of Dixit (1993) , even though here we consider a continuum of projects with total costs, w ½ L + K; which are linear in the labor input. 22 Taking logs of b(L) we get¯log Q(L) ¡ (¯¡ 1) log(
Lemma 4 The optimal dimension of the EF is given by:
As for the NF , since the r.h.s. of (15) is less than one, a necessary condition is a production elasticity " QL < 1:
23 Going through the same calibration of the NF , we get a function B(L) depicted in Figure 2 .
23 It goes without saying that if entry costs are nul, condition (15) reduces to:
This is equivalent to the condition proposed by Dixit (1993) for an EF …rm that has to choose among alternative investment project of di¤erent dimension. See also Moretto (2003) for an analogous condition for an EF …rm that can incrementally contract its capacity.
16
A maximum for L lies between 2 and 3. If we compare the two …rms, we see that the optimal size of the EF is 2:99 (' 3) 24 while for the NF is 1:06
(' 1). 25 
NF versus EF entry strategies
On the basis of Lemma 2 and 4, we are able to show that:
Proposition 1 a) Over the range where the second order condition holds, the EF is operating with a higher dimension than the NF , i.e.:
is the minimum e¢cient scale.
26
b) The entry trigger prices react in distinct ways according to the …rm's organization, i.e.:
Proof. See Appendix.
The …rst part of the proposition con…rms the above numerical calculations shown in Figure 1 and 2 and it is consistent with the empirical …nding that NF s are smaller than corresponding EF s.
27 24 The number in brackets is the closest integer, since we do not use integer programming. 25 The two triggers p NF (L) and p EF (L) are, respectively, 63: 11 and 44:83. 26 With the above calibration b L = 1:13: 27 This is also consitent with literature on LMFs. " Labor-managed …rms will be smaller than their capitalist counterparts in the short-run when pro…t are positive" (Bonin and Putterman, 1987, p.15) . The same applies to the long run if pro…ts are strictly positive (ibidem, p.57).
To appreciate the intuition behind this result we go back to and rewrite the FOCs for the optimal dimension (9) and (15) at entry. For the EF , by multiplying both sides of (15) by p EF (L EF ) and simplifying we get:
Then, the EF; at entry, decides the optimal dimension equating the value marginal product to the market wage w: The EF is using L e¢ciently:
By analogous procedure for the NF we obtain:
Unlike the EF, the NF chooses the optimal size equating the value marginal product to the full wage, which exceeds the market wage w: The Marshallian full cost of the investment imputed to each employee-member is
; larger than w since members of the NF possess an option (to delay entry), not owned by employees of an EF . Would-be employee-members are special workers endowed with an option to give rise to a kind of Partnership and are therefore "more skillful" deserving a compensation larger than w. By the decreasing marginal product of labor, at entry the NF will have a smaller size than its twin mate EF , i.e. L NF < L EF :
The conclusion that the NF and the EF have di¤erent dimensions opens the way to further questions about the entry price as size changes. However, as the second part of Proposition 1 suggests, we cannot tell which one enters …rst, even though the NF and the EF operate at di¤erent scales (NF to the left of the minimum e¢cient scaleL; while EF to the right).
Both the NF and the EF undertake the entry investment when the market price equals the average total cost AC(L)´w 
A local study of the entry strategies
For more ‡eshy intuition on entry triggers we do some comparative statics on the e¤ect of uncertainty. The …rst important result is:
Proposition 2 If ¾ = 0 the EF and NF operate at the minimum e¢cient scale, i.e.:
and the entry strategy is the same, i.e.:
If ¾ ! 0; uncertainty disappears,¯= +1 and¯¡ while the gap between sizes widens, i.e.
28 If the market price has a positive drift ® > 0; then¯= ½=® and¯¡ 1 = ½¡® ½ : Therefore the deterministic results conform to those of the uncertainty case.
As the real option theory predicts, we show that increasing risk puts o¤ investment timing, i.e. the entry price increases with uncertainty. This follows from the "bad news principle of irreversible investment". A larger market variance makes the investment return more volatile with positive e¤ect on the option to invest. However, the net marginal bene…t of waiting, arising from the avoidance of an investment in the bad state, increases with uncertainty. This induces an entry delay (Bernanke, 1983) . Furthermore, as uncertainty increases, the NF gets larger and the EF smaller, making for a wider gap.
The intuition behind such a result may be better grasped referring to conditions (16) and (17) . As usual, for the EF , the higher entry price makes the …rm react by increasing the optimal size so as to keep the value marginal product in pace with the market wage.
For the NF; the full wage imputed to each employee-member goes up with ¾, and the …rm may desire to reduce its size to adjust the value marginal product. The calibrated comparison is in Table 3 .
Proposition 3 states the impossibility of a global rank in terms of entry prices for the two distinct …rms. Nonetheless, for small values of price volatility the above asymmetry of behavior bene…ts the NF . In particular,
by Proposition 2, we may derive the following:
Corollary 1 In terms of entry strategies, the NF is locally less risky than the EF .
The most striking result springs from local analysis around ¾ = 0: For low price volatility, the NF is locally less risky than the EF; since the NF 0 s set of entry prices is "less convex" than that of the EF . As it can be seen in Figure 3 , the entry boundary increases in di¤erent fashions for the two kinds of …rms.
Since the employee-members of a NF share equally the option to invest, they may demand a higher reward and require a smaller dimension to compensate for the increased risk. This lowers the net marginal bene…t of waiting of each individual member, reducing the incentive to delay entry. 
Discussion
Proposition 3 maintains that the lower is the volatility of the market price, the narrower is the gap between price and average total cost required to make the irreversible investment to enter. The vanishing of uncertainty makes the size of the two …rms converge to a unique level, one from above (the EF ) and the other from below (the NF ) since one increases it size with uncertainty, while the other does the opposite. In the deterministic case, EF s and NF s perform the same way and share the same optimal entry strategy (Proposition 2).
The employee-members receive a "salary" that is the sum of w plus the option to invest, whose value grows with uncertainty and makes entry strategies diverge. In the case of the EF the option is held by shareholders. While, the option to start-up in the hands of employee-members re ‡ects their skill to set up a …rm. This di¤erence is the one that commands a higher reward as uncertainty and sunk costs enter the picture. All these considerations are independent of the market structure in which the SU F is embedded (see Leahy, 1993) .
From the three Propositions the NF appears a more suitable entrepreneurial organization in times of high volatility, as the 1997 -2001 period was.
After all, as shown in Pastor and Veronesi (2004) , volatility boosts the value of a …rm even if there is no bubble.
Conclusions
We have gone through entry policies of two kinds of …rms, EF s and NF s;
to partially explain why, during the years between 1997 and 2001, we have observed a faster growth in the number of NF s vis à vis EF s.
We have seen that the main di¤erences between the two …rms are their size at entry and their way to react to uncertainty. The NF enters at a smaller size while the EF at a larger size. Moreover the EF is more risky around the entry price than the NF . Both statements may explain: Evidence coming from US Census data is de…nitely consistent with the theoretical observation that NF s are smaller than EF s.
The divergence between the two entry policies is due to the irreversible 23 commitment that is associated with entry decision under uncertainty.
Employee-members of the NF hold an option to enter whose value increases with market volatility. The option adds to the market wage making the total "salary" paid higher with respect to the EF . Under decreasing marginal productivity of labor, the NF enters at a smaller scale whenever there is price volatility. Employee-members of a NF hold an option that is the signal of a special ability to set up a …rm of their own. The option value increases with uncertainty and the size of the irreversible commitment, making the reward for employee-members di¤er from the sheer market wage even in the long run equilibrium of the …rm. All these considerations are consistent with the conclusion that the NF is less risky.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
Let start proving the …rst part of the proposition. To do this let's us recall that the EF 's optimal dimension is given by:
The FOC is:
while the SOC is:
In general a 00 (L) < 0 does not imply that b 00 (L) < 0: the two regions, where the SOC holds, overlap only partially. Therefore, we con…ne to their overlap-ping set. That is, over the range where the SOC holds, since L NF is such
For the second part let's de…ne the average cost function AC(L)´w
:
Further, taking the derivative with respect to L; we get:
or:
So there exists a valueL > 0 such that @AC @L = 0: This is given by:
The second order derivative is:
which con…rms that AC(L) is a convex function with a minimum represented byL:
Since (¯¡1) < 1; from the comparison between (19) and (15), we have that:
which, in the range where the SOC holds, implies thatL < L EF :
On the contrary, from the comparison between (19) and (9), we notice that the NF operates only in the descending branch of the curve to the left of the minimum. That is, we get:
which implies thatL > L NF . Then, the second part follows by convexity of
Proof of proposition 2
If ¾ ! 0 we get¯! +1 and¯¡ 1 ! 1: By direct inspections of (16) and (17) (or equivalently (9) and (15)), we get the …rst part.
Proof of proposition 3
By applying the implicit function theorem to (15) and (9), it can be shown that @L EF =@¯· 0 · @L NF =@¯. Then, since @@ ¾ < 0;¯¡ 1 decreases and the opposite e¤ect on optimal dimension follows. Moreover, totally di¤erentiat-ing (6) and (12) yields:
By the above result and (18) it is easy to ascertain the positivity of both. In particular, if ¾ ! 1 we have that¯! 1 and¯¡ 1 ! 0 and no type of …rm will enter in the market.
QED
Proof of Corollary 1
The slope of the entry price at ¾ = 0 can be found by evaluating (20) and (21) at L EF = L NF =L: Since AC 0 (L) = 0 we get:
Then, both …rms have the same slope of entry price at ¾ = 0: Di¤erenti-ating (20) and (21) once more with respect to ¾ and evaluating the result at zero yields: 
